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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Kloeckner v. Solis,
133 S. Ct. 596 (2012)
Synopsis:
Petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner, an employee of the Department 
of Labor (DOL), filed a complaint with the agency’s civil rights 
office, alleging that the agency had engaged in unlawful sex and age 
discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile work environment.1
Before her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
hearing took place, the DOL terminated petitioner’s employment.2
Petitioner subsequently filed an appeal to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB), claiming that her termination was a 
discriminatory removal.3 Petitioner made a request for a 
consolidation of her two cases and the proceeding took place before 
the EEOC judge, who terminated her proceeding on the basis of her 
bad-faith discovery misconduct.4 After her appeal of the EEOC 
decision lost before DOL, petitioner sought MSPB review of the 
DOL’s decision.5 MSPB dismissed petitioner’s appeal as untimely.6
Petitioner then brought this action against DOL in the U.S. District 
Court of Eastern Missouri.7 The court dismissed the complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction, holding that under section 7703(b)(1) of the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 19788 (CSRA), petitioner should have sought 
review in the Federal Circuit because petitioner’s claims had been 
dismissed on procedural grounds.9 The district court further stated 
that, pursuant to section 7703(b)(2) of the same act, only 
discrimination cases that MSPB had decided on the merits could go 




5 Id. at 603.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (b)(1) (2012). 
9 Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 603.
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to district court.10 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding.11 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a federal employee who has an 
agency action claim that is appealable to the MSPB based on an 
antidiscrimination statute listed in section 7703(b)(1) should seek 
review in district court, rather than the Federal Circuit, regardless of 
whether the MSPB decided her case on procedural grounds or on the 
merits.12
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
A basic understanding of the statutory framework is required 
to understand the facts of this case.  CSRA provides federal 
employees procedural protections based on the severity of the 
adverse employment action taken against the employee.13 An 
employee has the right to appeal to an independent adjudicator of 
federal employment disputes called the MSPB, but only when the 
employer’s action is particularly serious—such as for a termination 
of employment or a reduction of pay.14 When the employee couples 
such a claim with a charge against the agency for discrimination 
based on a federal statute, such as Title VII15 or the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,16 she is said to have 
brought a “mixed case,” as defined by section 7702(a)(1).17 A mixed 
case may proceed in many ways, by either (1) the filing of a 
discrimination complaint with the employee’s agency, from which a 
decision is appealable to the MSPB or by suing the agency in district 
court; or (2) the initiation of a suit with the MSPB, from which a 
decision is appealable to the EEOC or by judicial review.18 The issue 
in this case concerns where that post-MSPB judicial review should 
take place—in the Federal Circuit or in federal district court.19
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 607.
13 Id. at 600.
14 Id.
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2006).
16 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
17 Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 601.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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Section 7703(b)(1) of CSRA provides that a petition to 
review the MSPB’s final decision shall be filed in the Federal Circuit, 
and section 7703(b)(2) spells out the exception to this basic rule: 
cases of discrimination subject to section 7702 (“mixed cases”), shall 
be filed under the enforcement sections of antidiscrimination statutes, 
under which plaintiffs are authorized to bring suit in federal district 
court.20
The facts here establish a mixed case.  In June 2005, 
petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the agency’s 
civil rights office, alleging that her employer, DOL, had engaged in 
unlawful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile 
work environment.21 Because petitioner did not suffer a sufficiently 
serious personnel action, her case was not appealable to the MSPB, 
and she was assigned an EEOC hearing instead.22 DOL discharged 
her a month later, before the EEOC hearing took place.23 Petitioner 
believed the agency’s action was discriminatory, which—coupled 
with her previous claim—gave her a mixed case.24
Petitioner initiated her discriminatory removal suit with the 
MSPB but realized her claims there were so similar to her EEOC 
claims that she was concerned about incurring duplicative discovery 
costs.25 Petitioner thus asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without 
prejudice, and the MSPB granted such a dismissal for four months 
with the right to refile thirty days after her EEOC case decision was 
rendered, or by January 18, 2007, whichever occurred first.26 The 
EEOC judge terminated the EEOC proceeding and returned 
petitioner’s case for DOL to decide, after the judge determined that 
petitioner had engaged in bad-faith conduct during discovery.27 Six 
20 Id. “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed 
under any such [statute] must be filed within 30 days after the date the individual 
filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable action under such section 
7702.”  5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (2012).  See infra text accompanying note 38
(language of § 7702).






27 Id. at 602–03.
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months later, in November of 2007, DOL found against petitioner on 
all of the claims.28 Petitioner filed a timely appeal for the DOL 
ruling, but MSPB declined to treat it as an ordinary appeal, 
dismissing petitioner’s appeal as an attempt to reopen her expired 
MSPB case.29
Petitioner then brought an action against DOL in federal 
district court, where the court dismissed the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.30 Because petitioner’s case was dismissed on procedural 
grounds, the court found that she should have sought review under 
the Federal Circuit, pursuant to section 7703(b)(1).31 Only where 
MSPB decided petitioner’s discriminatory claims on the merits, 
could petitioner file in federal district court.32 The Eighth Circuit 
concurred, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Secretary 
of Labor’s interpretation was inconsistent with the natural reading of 
sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(b)(2).33
The Secretary argued that CSRA intended to limit the district 
court to MSPB merit decisions and to procedural rulings to the 
Federal Circuit because the section 7703(b)(2) exception for mixed 
cases applies only when the MSPB’s decision in a mixed case is a 
“judicially reviewable action” under section 7702.34 Additionally, 
the Secretary argued that section 7702(a)(3) defines what “judicially 
reviewable actions” are and, read together with section 7702(a)(1), 
excludes procedural decisions from the realm of “judicially 
reviewable actions.”35 This conclusion is reached by reading two 
sections of CSRA together.36 Section 7702(a)(3) states, “any 
decision of the Board under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be 
a judicially reviewable action as of . . . the date of issuance of the 
decision.”37 Section 7702(a)(1) states the time limit by which the 





33 Id. at 604.
34 Id.; see supra note 20 (language of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (2012)).
35 Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 605.
36 Id.
37 Id. (emphasis added). 
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MSPB has to “decide both the issue of discrimination and the 
appealable action in accordance with the Board’s appellate 
procedures . . . .”38 DOL first contends that the “issue of 
discrimination” in section 7702(a)(1) can only be a decision of the 
Board when it is decided on the merits; a procedural decision is not a 
decision of the Board.39 Secondly, because it is not a decision of the 
Board, then under 7702(a)(3) it is also not a “judicially reviewable 
action.”40 The Supreme Court rejected such a reading, holding that 
DOL failed to explain why Congress would have “constructed such 
an obscure path” to achieve the simple result of directing procedural 
reviews to the Federal Circuit.41
Impact:
This case demonstrates that courts can reject DOL’s 
interpretation of a statute if the agency’s construction is inconsistent 
with the natural reading of the statute.42 Furthermore, the case 
clarifies the law for all mixed cases filed under the CSRA: when the 
employee-complainant opts for judicial review of an MSPB decision, 
the federal district court, rather than the Federal Circuit, is the 
appropriate venue for appeal on not only merits-based cases but also 
dismissals based on procedural grounds.43
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,
133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013)
Synopsis:
In September 2006, respondent Northwestern Environmental 
Defense Center (NEDC) filed suit against certain corporations that 
were engaged in logging and paper-production (including petitioner 
38 Id. (quoting § 7702(a)(1)).
39 Id. at 605.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 604.
43 Id. at 607.
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Georgia-Pacific West) and state and local governments and officials 
(including petitioner State Forester of Oregon, Doug Decker).44 The 
suit alleged that petitioners had violated the Clean Water Act for 
discharging channeled stormwater runoff into two Oregon rivers 
without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit.45 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon 
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, concluding that the 
“ditches, culverts, and channels” that carried the runoff were not 
point sources of pollution and petitioners were thus exempt from the 
NPDES permitting scheme.46 The Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of 
respondents,47 finding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) Silvicultural Rule, which defined what categories of 
discharges were point sources,48 was ambiguous on whether the 
conveyances at issue were point sources.49 The Ninth Circuit further 
held that petitioners had been in violation of the Act because their 
discharges were from point sources that are not exempt from the 
NPDES permitting scheme under the EPA’s Industrial Stormwater 
Rule.50 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EPA’s 
interpretation was a permissible one and thus the discharges did not 
require a NPDES permit.51
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Oregon’s abundant rainfall carries a large amount of dirt and 
crushed gravel from forest logging roads into a system of ditches, 
culverts, and channels that discharge into streams and rivers.52 This 
stormwater runoff is a source of water pollution containing sediment 
44 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1333 (2013).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1333–34.
48 Id. at 1331.
49 Id. at 1333.
50 Id. at 1334.
51 Id. at 1338.
52 Id. at 1333.
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that can degrade water quality and harm aquatic life.53 While Oregon 
owns and controls the logging roads in the Tillamook State Forest, 
the logging and paper-product firms are contractually obligated to 
maintain the roads that they use to haul timber.54 NEDC invoked the 
Clean Water Act’s citizen suit-provision,55 and sued petitioners for 
causing “discharges of channeled stormwater runoff into two 
waterways—the South Fork Trask River and the Little South Fork 
Kilchis River.”56 In its suit, NEDC alleged that the logging firms 
violated the Act by failing to obtain NPDES permits.57
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,58 also known as the 
Clean Water Act, was enacted in 1972 to regulate the discharge of 
pollutants into navigable waters.59 The Act made it unlawful for 
water to be discharged from a point source without the required 
NPDES permit and defined “point source” to include any “ditch, 
channel, tunnel, conduit . . . from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.”60 To clarify the law, the EPA issued new regulations 
such as the Silviculture Rule,61 which defined “point sources” with 
more precision.62 The Silviculture Rule brought “any discharge from 
a logging-related source that qualifies as a point source” within the 
NEDC permitting scheme.63
Congress modified the Silviculture Rule by adding statutory 
exemptions for certain stormwater runoffs, including “discharges 
composed entirely of stormwater.”64 The general exemption does not 
53 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1191 (D. Or. 
2007), rev’d, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. 
Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
54 Id.
55 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006). 
56 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333.
57 Id.
58 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1274 (2006).
59 Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-clean-water-act (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
60 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)).
61 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2012). 
62 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1331–32.
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apply to all stormwater discharges, however.65 Congress also 
directed the EPA to continue regulating industrial stormwater 
discharges.66 Accordingly, the EPA issued the Industrial Stormwater 
Rule, which defined stormwater discharge as any discharge that is 
“directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials 
storage areas at an industrial plant.”67 The Industrial Stormwater 
Rule explicitly included discharges from “immediate access roads 
and rail lines used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, 
manufactured products, waste material, or by-products used or 
created by the facility.”68 The Industrial Stormwater Rule names
certain industries—which are classified as Standard Industrial 
Classification 24—as industrial activities covered by the rule.69
Standard Industrial Classification 24 encompasses the “Logging” 
industry, which it identifies as “[e]stablishments primarily engaged in 
cutting timber and in producing . . . primary forest or wood raw 
materials.”70 The Industrial Stormwater Rule underwent an 
amendment three days before this case was argued before the Court, 
but it was not germane to this decision as the Court refused to 
conduct a “first view” on the amended regulation.71 However, the 
Court stated that the new regulation does not render moot the current 
suit because petitioners might still be liable for their past violations 
under the pre-amended regulation.72
NEDC argued that the general exemption did not apply in this 
case because harvesting   timber is unambiguously an “industrial” 
activity that triggers the application of the EPA’s Industrial 
Stormwater Rule.73 NEDC contended that support could be found in 
65 Id. at 1332.
66 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that a “discharge 
associated with industrial activity” is an exception to the general exemption for 
discharges consisting entirely of stormwater).
67 Id.
68 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)).
69 Id.
70 Id. (emphasis added) (citing the DEPT. OF LABOR, STANDARD 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS MANUAL, available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)).
71 Id. at 1332, 1335.
72 Id. at 1335.
73 Id. at 1336.
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the Industrial Stormwater Rule itself, as the regulation included 
discharges from “immediate access roads . . . used or traveled by 
carriers of raw materials.”74 NEDC also pointed out that the 
Industrial Stormwater Rule included “[f]acilities classified as 
Standard Industrial Classificatio[n] 24,” of which “logging” was 
included.75 The EPA disputed this interpretation, arguing that the 
Industrial Stormwater regulation’s reference to “facilities,” and the 
Standard Industrial Classification 24’s reference to “establishments,” 
both demonstrated that the Rule was intended to regulate discharges 
from industrial sites “more fixed and permanent than outdoor timber-
harvesting operations.”76 The Supreme Court determined that, while 
the regulation could be read either NEDC’s or the EPA’s way, the 
EPA’s interpretation would prevail and exempt the NPDES permit 
requirement for discharges of stormwater runoff from logging 
roads.77 “Auer deference”78 to the EPA’s interpretation of its own 
regulation was appropriate because the agency had been consistent in 
its view that permits were not required for the types of discharges at 
issue.79 The Supreme Court further held that the EPA’s 
interpretation was a permissible one, not one that was “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”80
74 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)); see supra text 
accompanying note 67 (language of the Industrial Stormwater Rule).
75 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336 (alteration in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 
122.26(b)(14)); see supra text accompanying note 68 (language of the Standard 
Industrial Classification 24).
76 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336–37.
77 Id. at 1337.
78 Auer deference means that when Congress has not directly spoken to the 
specific issue, courts must sustain the agency’s approach as long as it is a 
permissible construction of the relevant statute.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 
457 (1997) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984)).
79 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337; see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (holding that the Department of Labor’s new 
interpretation of its regulation was not accorded deference because the Court found 
it was a post hoc justification adopted in response to litigation).  
80 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337 (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 
131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).
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Impact:
With this decision, the Supreme Court reaffirms Auer 
deference to agency decisions, which is an issue that goes “to the 
heart of administrative law.”81 This case shows that the EPA’s 
authority, as an agency, to interpret its own regulations will continue 
to enjoy deference unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”82 Furthermore, this case 
establishes that, even where amendments to regulations at issue are 
made, a justiciable controversy remains because liability may still 
attach under the earlier version of the regulation.83
Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,
133 S. Ct. 817 (2013)
Synopsis:
Hospitals sought review of ten-year-old Medicare 
reimbursement payments but were denied review by the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).84 HHS 
rejected the providers’ claims based on untimeliness, as provided 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3).85 The district court dismissed the 
hospitals’ claims, holding that equitable tolling did not apply because 
Congress did not provide for it anywhere in the statute.86 The court 
of appeals reversed, making a contrary finding that nothing in the 
statute indicated that Congress precluded equitable tolling and, 
furthermore, the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling that 
applies to suits against private defendants should apply to suits 
81 Id. at 1339 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 1337 (majority opinion) (quoting McCoy, 131 S. Ct. at 880).
83 Id. at 1335.
84 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 823; see also Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 
55, 70 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 817 
(2013).
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against the United States.87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
the Secretary of HHS to resolve a conflict among courts of appeals 
deciding whether the 180-day time limit stated in § 1395oo(a)(3) was 
jurisdictional and whether equitable tolling applies to healthcare 
providers’ Medicare reimbursement appeals to the Provider 
Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB).88
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The Medicare program reimburses a fixed amount per person 
for certain inpatient services that hospitals provide for Medicare 
beneficiaries.89 To offset higher per-patient costs incurred by lower-
income patients, Congress authorized an upward adjustment of the 
total reimbursement amount for hospitals with a “disproportionate 
share” of low-income patients.90 The Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services’s (CMS) calculation of the Supplemental Security 
Income fraction (SSI fraction) for each participating hospital in part 
determines the disproportionate share adjustment to which each 
hospital is entitled.91 The CMS submits the numbers to government 
contractors known as fiscal intermediaries, which calculate the total 
payment due to each hospital.92 Upon receipt of the Notice of 
Program Reimbursement (NPR) informing the provider how much it 
will be reimbursed, the hospital has 180 days to appeal to the 
PRRB.93 The problem in this case arose from the CMS’s erroneous 
omission of several categories of SSI data from its calculations, 
which resulted in the underpayment of healthcare providers for many 
years.94 The mistake was not disclosed to all affected providers until 
March 2006, at which time the hospitals in this case filed a complaint 
87 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 823; see also Sebelius, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
88 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824.
89 Id. at 822.
90 Id.
91 Id. The SSI fraction is determined by the percentage of patients served 
by the hospital who are eligible for SSI payments.  Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) (2006).
94 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 822–23.
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with the PRRB within 180 days, seeking readjustment of 
reimbursements for the years 1987 through 1994.95
The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction because it had no 
equitable powers other than what was authorized by Congress or the 
Secretary.96 The Secretary’s regulation permits the PRRB to extend 
the 180-day time limit upon a showing of good cause, but states that 
such an extension cannot be granted if the request for appeal is filed 
more than three years after the NPR was mailed to the provider.97
The district court held that equitable tolling was not available, but the 
court of appeals disagreed.98 Upon the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari, three positions were briefed: (1) that the 180-day limitation 
for appeals to the PRRB is “jurisdictional,” and therefore HHS and 
the courts cannot step into Congress’s shoes to extend it; (2) that the 
Secretary has the authority to limit appeals to the PRRB to three 
years; and (3) the doctrine of equitable tolling applies because the 
Secretary failed to disclose information that prevented the injured 
parties from making a timely appeal.99
Addressing the jurisdictional argument, the Supreme Court 
noted the importance of reining in the use of “jurisdiction,”100 and 
applied the bright line rule for determining whether a statutory 
limitation is jurisdictional.  A rule is jurisdictional where Congress 
has “clearly stated” that the rule is jurisdictional.101 If Congress has 
not made a clear statement, as interpreted by context or explicit 
language, courts shall treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.102 The 
Court found that the language of § 1395oo(a)(3) “hardly reveals a 
design to preclude any regulatory extension” and, furthermore, the 
Court has repeatedly held that filing deadlines, such as § 
1395oo(a)(3)’s 180-day deadline, were ordinarily not jurisdictional 
95 Id. at 823.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 822; see also 42 CFR § 405.1841(b) (2007).
98 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 823.
99 Id.
100 Because objections to a tribunal may be raised at any time, tardy 
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but “quintessential claim-processing rules.”103 Additionally, a 
nonjurisdictional requirement “does not become jurisdictional simply 
because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains 
jurisdictional provisions.”104
The Supreme Court addressed the equitable tolling argument 
along with the argument regarding the Secretary’s authority to limit 
the time of appeal to the PRRB,105 as the Secretary’s regulation 
explicitly precludes an extension of the deadline past three years, 
which inhibits the application of equitable tolling.  The Court noted 
that Congress gave the Secretary the rulemaking authority to 
administer Medicare and applied Chevron deference, stating that it 
had no authority to overturn the Secretary’s regulation unless it was 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”106 The 
Secretary’s regulation passed this test because it advanced the 
parties’ interest of finality in reimbursement decisions.107
The Court also specifically addressed the court of appeals’ 
holding, which was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin 
v. Department of Veterans Affairs.108 In Irwin, the Court held that 
“the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to 
suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the 
United States.”109 The Court stated that the principle did not apply in 
this case because the presumption of equitable tolling applied only 
where Congress would have intended it to apply.110 Not only did 
Congress leave out statutory exemptions when it initially imposed the 
180-day deadline, Congress left the provision untouched throughout 
six amendments over the past forty years.111 Additionally, the 
Secretary has prohibited the PRRB from extending that deadline for 
nearly forty years as well, and Congress never expressed disapproval 
103 Id. at 824–25.
104 Id. at 825 (citing Gonzales v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012)).
105 Id. at 826.
106 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating Chevron deference is owed to the agency where 
Congress has explicitly left a gap in the laws for the agency to fill by regulation)).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 827; see Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
109 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 827 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96).
110 Id.
111 Id.
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of that regulation.112 Lastly, § 1395oo(a)(3) was not meant to be 
protective of claimants, which are “‘sophisticated’ institutional 
providers assisted by legal counsel,” and which nonetheless are 
permitted to apply equitable tolling to address claims of “fraud or 
similar fault.”113 Thus, the Court held, § 1395oo(a)(3) was not a 
jurisdictional issue that precluded the Secretary’s interpretation; and 
moreover, the Secretary’s preclusion of equitable tolling under § 
1395oo(a)(3) was permissible.114
Impact:
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to 
clarify that the Court’s decision in this case does not generally 
preclude the use of the equitable tolling doctrine in administrative 
appeals.115 As the Court stated, Congress’s intent is the key 
determination as to whether equitable tolling is available.116 Overall, 
this case not only more narrowly impacts the ability of healthcare 
providers to appeal their reimbursement determinations to the PRRB 
after the three-year deadline,117 it also broadly impacts the way lower 
courts will analyze the application of the equitable tolling doctrine in 
other contexts.
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC,
729 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Cable companies petitioned for review of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2011 Revision of the 
112 Id.
113 Id. at 828.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
116 Id.
117 See id. at 824 (majority opinion).
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Commission’s Program Carriage Rules (2011 FCC Order).118 The 
2011 FCC Order, which was promulgated under the Communications 
Act of 1934 (Communications Act) and amended by the Cable 
Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), 
directed the FCC to “establish regulations governing program 
carriage agreements and related practices” between the cable 
companies and the video programming vendors (also known as 
“networks”), from which they purchased content.119 At issue was the 
2011 FCC Order’s new standstill rule that required a cable company 
to maintain certain preexisting contracts for a specified period of 
time.120 The cable companies challenged the order in two ways, by 
arguing that (1) the order violated their First Amendment right to free 
speech because it restricted the editorial determinations of the cable 
companies concerning what networks to provide to their 
subscribers,121 and (2) the order’s standstill rule violated the notice-
and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).122 The Second Circuit denied the petitions in part regarding 
the First Amendment challenge and granted the petition in part 
regarding the APA challenge.123 The court also vacated without 
prejudice the FCC’s standstill rule, to allow the FCC to re-
promulgate the rule in a manner consistent with the APA.124
118 Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2013).
119 Id. at 145.
120 Id. at 150.
121 Id. at 145.  This summary will not address the arguments of the First 
Amendment challenge regarding the 2011 FCC Order’s revision of the 1993 FCC 
Order’s requirements for a prima facie case brought by an unaffiliated video 
programming vendor.  See id. at 147–49, 154–68.
122 Id. at 150.
123 Id. at 171.
124 Id.  The APA requires agencies to provide notice and an opportunity 
for public comment as a prerequisite to promulgating a rule.  Id. at 167; see also 5
U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2006).
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Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
A. The Anticompetitive Video Programming Industry and 
Congress’s Attempt to Curb It Via the Cable Act
The video programming industry consists of networks such as 
ESPN, Bravo, and CNN, “which create or acquire [content], such as 
television shows and movies . . . .”125 They sell the content to 
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), which 
include cable operators, direct broadcast satellite providers, and 
phone companies.126 They also sell content to online video 
distributors (OVDs).127 When Congress enacted the Cable Act in 
1992, cable operators dominated the MVPD market in the United 
States, where cable companies enjoyed a local monopoly in one or 
more geographical regions.128 For example, to this day, Comcast 
continues to have a stronghold over “the mid-Atlantic, Chicago, 
Denver, and Northern California,” while Time Warner’s subscribers 
are “clustered in New York, . . . the Carolinas, Ohio, Southern 
California, . . . and Texas.”129 Not only did this phenomenon 
discourage competition, it also created “bottleneck” control for cable 
companies.130 The anticompetitive power of the cable companies 
was further enhanced by pervasive vertical integration of the market, 
which is done when a cable company acquires ownership interest in 
both the programming and distribution system.131 For instance, 
Comcast has ownership interests in fifty national networks, including 
Bravo, E! Entertainment TV, CNBC, and The Weather Channel.132
These “affiliated” networks are presumed to enjoy greater advantage 
125 Time Warner, 729 F.3d at 143.
126 Id. at 143–44.
127 Id. at 143.
128 Id. at 145.
129 Id. at 153 (citing Annual Assessment of the Status of Completion in the 
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8628–29 n.96 
(2012)).
130 Time Warner, 729 F.3d at 145.  “Bottleneck” control is defined as a 
cable company’s ability to prevent its subscribers from accessing programs it chose 
to exclude.  Id.
131 Id. at 146.
132 Id.
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with the cable operators than unaffiliated networks.133 On the other 
hand, Congress also considered contrary evidence that vertical 
integration stimulated the development of programming.134 Thus, 
instead of enacting an outright ban on vertical integration, Congress 
instead chose to bar cable operators from “discriminating against 
unaffiliated programmers” to reduce their anticompetitive power.135
Section 616(a)(3) of the Communications Act gives the FCC 
clear authority to establish regulations that “govern[] program 
carriage agreements and related practices” between cable operators 
and MVPDs and networks.”136 The statute specifies that the 
regulations shall contain provisions designed to prevent MVPDs 
from “discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis 
of affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors.”137 Section 616(a)(5) 
authorizes the FCC to provide penalties and remedies for such 
violations, “including carriage.”138
B. The 2011 FCC Order and the APA Challenge to Its New 
Standstill Rule
In 2007, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
(NPRM) as a part of the notice-and-comment procedure to solicit 
comments on (1) the clarification of the elements of a prima facie 
section 616(a)(3) violation and (2) the adoption of rules to address 
the complaint process.139 Regarding the latter, the FCC also 
requested comment on the adoption of rules to protect networks 
“from potential retaliation if they file a complaint,” and the 
appropriateness of the existing penalties for section 616(a)(3) 
violations.140
The 2011 FCC Order pronounced a new prima facie standard 
and created a standstill rule.141 The prima facie standard complied 
133 Id. at 146–47.
134 Id. at 147.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 145 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 536(a) (2006)).
137 Id. at 146 (quoting § 536(a)(3)).
138 Id. (quoting § 536(a)(5)).
139 Id. at 148.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 149.
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with the APA requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
thus will not be discussed here.  The standstill rule, on the other hand, 
was met with an APA challenge for its failure to adhere to the notice-
and-comment requirements.142 In substance, the standstill rule 
allowed the FCC to grant requests to order a MVPD to temporarily 
maintain its preexisting contract on unchanged terms with a program 
carriage complainant seeking renewal of the contract.143 The purpose 
of this rule was two-fold: (1) to prevent retaliation against a 
programming vendor who has filed a legitimate section 616(a)(3) 
claim of discrimination; and (2) to help networks resist the carriage 
demands of MVPDs, especially demands that violate the program 
carriage rules.144
The FCC denied that notice-and-comment rulemaking applied 
to the standstill rule, arguing that the rule was one of agency 
“procedure” rather than of “substance,” as it codified a preexisting 
procedure to vindicate rights given under section 616(a)(3).145 The 
Second Circuit disagreed, stating that the test for whether a rule may 
be categorized as “procedural” depends on whether the “substantive 
effect [of the rule] is sufficiently grave” so as to justify public 
participation “to ensure the agency has all pertinent information 
before it when making a decision.”146 The standstill rule does not fall 
into this procedural exception because it confers authority to the FCC 
to temporarily extend a contractual agreement, which significantly 
affects the substantive rights of the parties involved, namely the 
MVPD and the unaffiliated network that has a pending complaint 
before the FCC.147
In any event, the FCC contended that the standstill rule 
complied with the APA because it was a “logical outgrowth” of the 
2007 NPRM’s solicitation for comments on whether the FCC should 
adopt rules to protect networks “from potential retaliation if they file 
a complaint.”148 The Second Circuit also rejected this argument, 
142 Id. at 167.
143 Id. at 150.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 168 (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
147 Id.
148 Id. at 150.
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holding that the 2007 NPRM solicitations were “too general to 
provide adequate notice” that the FCC was contemplating a standstill 
rule.149 The strongest supporting fact for this finding of insufficient 
notice is that none of the public commenters addressed the role 
pursuant to the 2007 NPRM.150 Finally, the court juxtaposed the 
present case with the FCC’s express solicitation of comments 
concerning the adoption of a standstill rule for another provision 
under the Cable Act.151 The court concluded that the standstill rule 
promulgated in the 2011 FCC Order was substantive and, thus, 
subject to proper notice-and-comment procedures, which were 
lacking in this case.152
Impact:
The Second Circuit’s decision vacating the 2011 FCC Order 
may have broad free speech and economic impact for the national 
video programming industry.  Properly promulgated, it impacts the 
substantive rights of video programming vendors, their distributors, 
and ultimately the subscribers.  With this holding, it is unclear 
whether the rule will in fact come to fruition following a proper 
notice-and-comment procedure.  This case also provides a 
demonstration that where even temporary substantive rights are 
conferred—arguably to further agency procedure—the procedural 
exception to the notice-and-comment rule does not apply.  This case 
further provides a useful “logical outgrowth” analysis to determine 
whether a solicitation satisfies APA requirements.
149 Id. at 170.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 170–71.
152 Id. at 171.
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Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. NLRB,
721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Chambers of commerce challenged a rule promulgated by the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), arguing that the NLRB 
lacked authority to enact such a rule.153 The NLRB defended its 
rulemaking authority, contending the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA),154 vests in the NLRB the authority to enact the rule 
“requir[ing] employers subject to the [NLRA] . . . to post an official 
Board notice informing employees of their rights under the Act.”155
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina held that 
the NLRB had exceeded its authority, and granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs.156 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
district court that the NLRA’s rulemaking function was limited to “its 
statutorily defined reactive roles in addressing unfair labor practice 
charges and conducting representation elections upon request.”157
Therefore, the court concluded that the NLRB had no authority to 
promulgate the challenged rule.158
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
The NLRA, enacted in 1935, regulates relations between 
private sector employers, labor unions, and employees.159 Section 6 
of the NLRA (Section 6), conferred rulemaking power on the NLRB, 
giving it the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and 
rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the APA], such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the 
NLRA].”160
153 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 
2013).
154 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).





160 Id. at 155 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
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On August 30, 2011, the NLRB promulgated a regulation 
titled “Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor 
Relations Act.”161 The Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
and the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce (collectively, 
“Chambers”) challenged the rule in federal district court, asking for 
injunctive relief against the NLRB.162 The NLRB made its argument 
on two distinct legal bases.
First, according to Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 
Inc.,163 Section 6’s rulemaking grant required the NLRB’s rules to be 
upheld if they “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation.”164 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that 
Mourning applies only where the court has already affirmed that 
Congress had delegated interpretative powers to the agency.165 Here, 
it was at issue whether Congress had in fact delegated interpretative 
powers to the agency.166
Second, the NLRB’s broad rulemaking authority under 
Section 6 was affirmed by the Supreme Court in American Hospital 
Ass’n v. NLRB.167 As such, the NLRB should have the power to 
promulgate rules as it sees fit, except where Congress has expressly 
withheld that authority.168 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument 
as well, stating that the NLRB’s rulemaking authority, found in 
American Hospital Ass’n, was in fact limited.169 In American 
Hospital Ass’n, the Court upheld the NLRB’s promulgated rule, 
which proactively defined whether a designated unit was appropriate 
for the purposes of collective bargaining.170 The NLRB had 
authority to make such a rule because section 9(a) of the NLRA 
granted authority to the NLRB to make bargaining unit 
161 Id. at 156. 
162 Id. at 157.
163 411 U.S. 356 (1973). 
164 Chamber of Commerce of U.S., 721 F.3d at 158 (quoting Mourning,
411 U.S. at 369).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 499 U.S. 606 (1991). 
168 Chamber of Commerce of U.S., 721 F.3d at 159.
169 Id. at 164.
170 Id. at 159.
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determinations “in each case.”171 Section 9(a), read in conjunction 
with Section 6’s rulemaking provision, gave the NLRB the power to 
create a general rule that categorically makes decisions on behalf of 
the NLRB, precluding the need for the NLRB to make case-by-case 
adjudications. 172 Moreover, the grant of authority in American 
Hospital Ass’n was narrow.173 In sum, the Fourth Circuit stated that 
the NLRB was not free to promulgate any rule as it sees fit absent a 
grant of rulemaking authority from Congress.174
Applying the Chevron analysis,175 the Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that Congress did not give the NLRA rulemaking authority to make 
the notice-posting rule here pursuant to the APA’s notice-and-
comment procedure.176 First, congressional intent could not be found 
in the plain language of the statute.177 Section 6 “grants the [NLRB] 
authority to issue rules that are ‘necessary to carry out’ provisions of 
the Act.”178 The ambiguity of the term “necessary” did not indicate 
congressional delegation of authority.179 Secondly, the structure of 
the NLRA revealed that none of the provisions showed that Congress 
intended to give the NLRB this type of rulemaking authority.180 On a 
broader context, the NLRB serves only two “expressly reactive 
roles”: (1) to conduct representative elections and (2) to resolve 
unfair labor practice charges.181 Read more specifically, none of the 
provisions gave the NLRB the authority to make the notice-posting 
rule.182 The Fourth Circuit even rejected the NLRB’s argument that 
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 160.
174 Id.
175 The Chevron analysis requires: (1) using “‘traditional tools of statutory 
construction’ to ascertain congressional intent” and (2) if the statute is silent on the 
issue, then asking “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
176 Id. at 154, 161.
177 Id. at 160–61.
178 Id. at 160 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
179 Id. at 161–62.
180 Id. at 162.
181 Id.
182 See id. at 162–63.
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it had authority from Section 6 to make the failure to follow the 
notice-posting rule an unfair labor practice as defined by section 
8(a)(1).183 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that this “bootstrapping” 
would not be allowed.184 Thirdly, the legislative history of the Act 
did not provide evidence of the NLRB’s alleged power to enact the 
notice-posting rule.185 Not only do early versions of the Act indicate 
that only a reactive role was intended for the NLRB, Congress has 
also considered and rejected another notice provision for the 
NLRA.186 Finally, the history of regulation in this area shows that 
Congress has not intended for the NLRB to have authority to make a 
notice-posting rule, as several federal labor statutes passed between 
1936 and 1974—the date of the last NLRB amendment—provide for 
the posting of notices.187 One labor law was even amended to 
impose such a requirement.188 By contrast, the NLRA’s three 
amendments remain without a notice-posting provision.189
Therefore, the NLRB’s notice-posting rule is invalid for going 
beyond the NLRB’s limited scope of rulemaking authority.190
Impact:
This decision specifically denies the NLRB power to 
promulgate a notice-posting rule.191 More significantly, it clarifies 
the scope of NLRB’s rulemaking authority, limiting it to the NLRB’s 
ability to conduct representative elections and to resolve unfair labor 
practice charges.192 Above all, it provides that where Congress has 
not expressly defined the boundaries of an agency’s power, courts 
183 Id. at 163.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 164.
186 Id. at 164–65.  The contemplated notice requirement proposed to 
require any employer that was party to a NLRA-conflicting contract “to notify its 
employees of the violation and indicate the contract would be abrogated.”  Id. at
165.
187 Id. at 165–66.
188 Id. at 166.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 154, 166.
191 Id. at 154.
192 Id.
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have the authority to draw those boundaries by extrapolating 
Congress’s intent.193
Shweika v. Department of Homeland Security,
723 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Applicant prosecuted a single application for naturalization 
before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) and the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan.194 Because USCIS denied applicant’s petition, applicant 
continued to pursue his case in district court, where a de novo review 
of the denial was conducted.195 The district court also raised the 
issue of whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the 
application, as it was unclear whether the statute contained 
administrative hearing and administrative-exhaustion requirements, 
and, if so, whether the applicant had fulfilled the exhaustion 
requirement allowing for district court review.196 The district court 
determined that the administrative-exhaustion requirement could be 
inferred from the governing statute, the Immigration Act of 1990, and 
also determined that it imposed jurisdictional limitations on a district 
court.197 Because applicant failed to complete his administrative 
hearing, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide 
his case.198 The Sixth Circuit addressed the jurisdictional issues that 
the district court raised as a matter of first impression and determined 
that, in the absence of Congress’s clear statement to the contrary, the 
administrative-hearing requirement is nonjurisdictional.199 The 
193 See id.
194 Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 723 F.3d 710, 711–12 (6th Cir. 
2013).
195 Id. at 713.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 713–14.
199 Id. at 719.
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circuit court remanded the case to reconsider whether the applicant 
satisfied the administrative-hearing requirement.200
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Applicant Mazen Shweika applied to become a naturalized 
citizen in April 2004, but was denied a complete review for three 
years.201 Applicant obtained a writ of mandamus from the federal 
district court to compel the USCIS to review his application.202 The 
USCIS denied applicant’s petition in 2008, based on his failure to 
provide certified copies of documents related to a prior arrest, and 
applicant then sought an administrative hearing to appeal the 
denial.203 Applicant did not receive a hearing after ten months, even 
though by regulation the USCIS was required to schedule one within 
180 days of a timely request.204 Applicant then returned to district 
court to seek a writ of mandamus to compel USCIS to review his 
appeal and, in the alternative, he sought a hearing de novo.205 USCIS 
finally granted applicant’s administrative hearing in February 2010 
and conducted a de novo review of the application, which led to 
questions about a prior conviction and domestic violence allegations 
made by applicant’s ex-wife.206 Applicant left the interview at the 
advice of his counsel before the completion of the hearing.207 This 
led to USCIS’s denial of the application on the basis of the record 
before it and, among other things, for the applicant’s failure to 
establish good moral character—a requirement for naturalization.208
Applicant resumed his case in the district court, which held its own 
de novo review of the denial and determined that applicant had 
established his good moral character.209 The district court also 
200 Id. at 720.






207 Id. at 713.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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ordered additional briefing to determine whether it had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over applicant’s case.210
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), a person whose application for 
naturalization is denied under that subchapter can obtain a district 
court’s de novo review “after a hearing before an immigration 
officer under section 1447(a).”211 At issue was whether that 
language in § 1421(c) and the Immigration Act of 1990 confer an 
administrative-hearing requirement.212 The district court held that 
such a requirement had been inferred for § 1421(c) and that it was a 
jurisdictional restriction on the district court’s ability to grant the de 
novo review.213 The district court further read a completion 
requirement into the administrative-hearing requirement.214 Because 
applicant failed to complete the administrative hearing, he did not 
fulfill the administrative-exhaustion requirement of § 1421(c), and 
thus the district court lacked jurisdiction over his application.215
The Sixth Circuit began its review of applicant’s appeal by 
determining whether the district court was correct in holding the 
administrative-exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional.216 This was 
a matter of first impression for the court.217 The court applied the 
bright line rule stated by the Supreme Court in various cases,218 that a 
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope is jurisdictional only where 
Congress clearly states that a statute is jurisdictional.219 To discern 
whether Congress spoke on the character of the requirement requires 
an analysis of the limitation’s “text, context, and relevant historical 
treatment.”220
210 Id.




215 Id. at 713–14.
216 Id. at 714.
217 Id. at 714–15.
218 Id. at 714 (including, most recently, Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013)).
219 Id. (citing Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824).
220 Id. (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 
(2010)).
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The Sixth Circuit determined that the text of the section “does 
not speak in jurisdictional terms” as compared to other statutes that 
also concern the district court’s role in naturalization proceedings; 
rather, it lacks statements such as: “[the district] court has 
jurisdiction” or district courts “shall have authority to administer.”221
As to context, the court looked to the function of the requirement to 
determine whether it was meant to be jurisdictional.222 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that the administrative-hearing requirement 
is a “claim-processing rule” that requires exhaustion of the 
administrative proceedings, but is nonjurisdictional in almost all 
cases.223 Thus, the court concluded, “Congress has not made a clear 
statement regarding jurisdiction.”224
The circuit court then contemplated whether Chevron 
deference applied in regards to the USCIS’s interpretation of the 
statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on federal courts.225 This 
was also a matter of first impression for the court.226 Adopting the 
view of its sister courts, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, 
and D.C. Circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that “Chevron deference 
does not apply to an agency’s interpretation of a federal court’s 
jurisdiction.”227 First, the conditions that license Chevron do not 
apply because Chevron deference is warranted only where Congress 
has vested authority in the agency, whereas a jurisdiction-conferring 
statute delegates authority on federal courts.228 Second, courts defer 
to agencies because of their expertise, and here, federal courts are the 
“experts when it comes to determining the scope” of subject-matter 
221 Id. at 715 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1447(b), 1421(b)(1) (2012)).
222 Id. at 716.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 717.
225 Id. When reviewing the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that it administers, courts will apply the Chevron analysis, which requires 
the court to: (1) use “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to ascertain 
congressional intent” and (2) if the statute is silent on the issue, to then ask 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”  Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
226 Id. at 718.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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jurisdiction.229 Third, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a 
strong presumption exists for judicial review of administrative action, 
which has not been overcome by any evidence of Congress’s intent 
to overcome this strong presumption.230 Thus, the circuit court 
concluded, the courts do not owe Chevron deference to the USCIS’s 
decision.231 Further, the Sixth Circuit found that Congress has not 
made § 1421(c)’s administrative-hearing requirement 
jurisdictional.232 Because this determination was made incorrectly at 
the district court level, the circuit court remand the proceeding back 
to the district court to determine “whether § 1421(c)’s administrative-
hearing requirement implies a completion requirement” and whether 
applicant satisfied it.233
Impact:
The Sixth Circuit determined as a matter of first impression 
that § 1421(c) does not contain a jurisdictional limitation, which 
confirmed the view taken by a number of circuit courts.234 The case 
also has a wider application as it provides a clear analysis showing 
that Chevron deference does not apply in agency interpretations of 
federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.235
SEC v. Das,
723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Defendant, a former chief financial officer of a publicly 
traded corporation, was prosecuted under the Securities Exchange 
229 Id.
230 Id. at 718–19.
231 Id. at 719.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 719–20.
234 Id. at 718.
235 Id. at 719. 
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Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) for violating several securities laws.236
The district court, after a ten-day jury trial, found defendant liable on 
every claim.237 Several issues were on appeal in the Eighth Circuit, 
including whether the district court abused its discretion in 
instructing the jury by omitting the requirement of scienter for the 
section 14(a), Rule 14a-9, Rule 13b2-1, and Rule 13b2-2 claims.238
The Eighth Circuit rejected defendant’s argument that scienter was 
required for violating those securities laws and affirmed the district 
court’s jury instructions.239
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Stormy Dean was a former chief financial officer (CFO) at 
infoUSA, a publicly traded corporation headquartered in Omaha, 
Nebraska.240 infoUSA’s predecessor company was founded by 
Vinod Gupta, who served as infoUSA’s chief executive officer and 
chairman until 2008.241 Gupta was discovered to have used 
infoUSA’s funds to pay for his personal expenses, such as private jet 
travel, yacht payments and expenses, luxury cars, membership to 
thirty private country clubs, and personal life insurance policies.242
These payments were not reported in infoUSA’s filings, which Dean 
certified as the company’s CFO.243
Following an informal inquiry in late 2007, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action in 
2010 against Dean and another former CFO, Rajnish Das.244 The 
action included allegations of: (1) soliciting false proxy statements in 
violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, Rule 14a-3, and Rule 
14a-9; (2) falsifying books, records, or accounts in violation of 
section 13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1; and (3) deceiving auditors in 
236 SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2013).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 952–56.
239 Id. at 955–56.
240 Id. at 946.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 947.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 946.
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violation of Rule 13b2-2.245 The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Nebraska ruled in favor of the SEC on every claim and Dean 
appealed.246
One of the appeals was based on Dean’s contention that the 
district court abused its discretion concerning the jury instructions by 
omitting the scienter requirement for the section 14(a) and Rule 14a-
9 claims.247 The jury instructions had required the SEC to 
demonstrate that Dean had merely negligently approved or signed the 
proxy statements that later proved to be false or misleading.248
Relying on previous dicta and the decisions of sister courts, the 
Eighth Circuit determined as a matter of first impression that scienter 
was not an element of a section 14(a) or Rule 14a-9 claim against a 
corporation’s officer.249 Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s jury instructions.250
Another basis of Dean’s appeal was whether the district court 
abused its discretion as to the Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 jury 
instructions, which required the jury to find Dean liable if it 
determined that he did not act “reasonably.”251 Borrowing the 
Seventh Circuit’s Chevron analysis,252 the court rejected Dean’s 
argument that the correct standard for Rule 13b2-1 was 
“knowingly.”253 When Congress amended section 13(b) to provide 
that scienter was a requirement to impose criminal liability, this 
245 Id. at 947.
246 Id. at 947–48.
247 Id. at 952.
248 Id. at 953.
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 953–54.
251 Id. at 954.
252 When reviewing the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
that it administers, courts will apply the Chevron analysis, which requires the court 
to: (1) use “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to ascertain congressional 
intent” and (2) if the statute is silent on the issue, to then ask “whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
253 Das, 723 F.3d at 954 (citing McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 789 
(7th Cir. 2006)).
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“plainly” implied that section 13(b) did not require the defendant take 
knowing action in order to be held accountable for civil liability.254
The court engaged in statutory interpretation regarding Rule 
13b2-2 by examining the plain language of section 13(b)(2),255 from 
which Rule 13b2-2 was derived.256 Section 13(b)(2) requires issuers 
of securities to make and keep accurate records, while section 
13(b)(4) states “[n]o criminal liability shall be imposed” for failure to 
comply with section 13(b)(2) unless section 13(b)(5) applies.257
Section 13(b)(5) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly” falsify 
records as described under section 13(b)(2).258 The court interpreted 
section 13(b)(5) as proof of Congress’s intent for “knowing” acts to 
trigger the criminal liability provision contained in section 
13(b)(4).259 This, the court reasoned, indicated that “knowing” is 
“otherwise not an element of a civil claim.”260 Moreover, the court 
stated that Congress did not adopt section 13(b)(5), which contains 
the knowing provision, until 1988—after Rule 13b2-2 was issued.261
Finally, the court gave substantial deference to the SEC’s 
construction of its own regulations.262 This reasoning persuaded the 
court to affirm the district court’s omission of scienter from the jury 
instructions at issue.263
Impact:
In this case, the Eighth Circuit weighed in on the requirement 
of scienter for important provisions of the Exchange Act, setting the 
stage for a possible Supreme Court ruling on the issue.  The Eighth 
Circuit ruled that there is no scienter requirement to prove a section 
14(a) or Rule 14a-9 claim, which is a view consistent with that of the 
254 Id. (citing SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998)).
255 Id. at 955.
256 Id. at 956.
257 Id. at 955.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 955–56.
261 Id. at 956.
262 Id.
263 See id.
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Seventh, Second, and Third Circuits.264 In agreement with the 
Seventh and Second Circuits, the court also ruled that Rules 13b2-1
and 13b2-2 do not require a finding that a defendant has acted
“knowingly.”265 This case also demonstrated that in accordance with 
Chevron, the SEC’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to 
substantial deference.266
264 Id. at 954.
265 Id. at 954, 956.
266 Id. at 956.
